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INTRODUCTION 
Since 1908 when the Supreme Court decided Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 
(1908), tribal reserved water rights have been the subject of numerous adjudications and 
Congressional settlements involving Indian reservations in many different states, 1  including 
Idaho.2  Through all this time, there has never been a determination by a court or Congress that a 
federally recognized tribe had no reserved water rights at all for its Reservation.  The argument 
that the North Idaho Water Rights Group (“NIWRG”) is advancing here, seeking a ruling that the 
Coeur d’Alene Tribe has no reserved water rights, is a fundamental attack on the very notion that 
Indian tribes are entitled to federally protected water rights on their reservations.   
NIWRG dresses up this extreme argument in various ways, relying in large part on a 
strict “test of necessity,” NIWRG Br. at 11-20, that is fundamentally inconsistent with the 
Winters doctrine itself.  According to NIWRG, the “test of necessity” would defeat reserved 
water rights claims for every single purpose advanced by the Coeur d’Alene Tribe (“Tribe”) and 
the United States.  While Winters and its progeny assure that water is broadly reserved for the 
purposes of an Indian reservation, NIWRG suggests instead that the Tribe should be relegated to 
a bleak survival without water either for traditional purposes or for future progress—not for 
hunting and fishing, not for agriculture, and not even for domestic uses. NIWRG Br. at 12-16, 
16-20, 23-24.  In NIWRG’s view, reserved water isn’t “necessary” for those purposes unless the 
Tribe’s members simply could not live on the Reservation at all without it.  No court has ever 
suggested such an approach to tribal reserved water rights.  
                                                          
1 Tribal water rights settlements ratified by Congress through 2010 are compiled in Cohen’s 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law (“Cohen’s Handbook”), § 19.05[2] at 1247-48, n. 47 (Nell 
Jessup Newton, ed., 2012). 
2 Snake River Water Rights Act of 2004, Pub L. No. 108-447, div. J, tit. X, 118 Stat. 2809, 
3431-41 (Nez Perce Tribe); Fort Hall Indian Water Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-602, 
104 Stat. 3059 (Shoshone-Bannock Tribes). 
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NIWRG’s apparent reason for advancing this absolute “necessity” argument is that the 
Tribe’s reserved water rights claims could otherwise adversely impact junior state water right 
holders. NIWRG Br. at 11.  Of course, that is the overall nature of water law in a prior 
appropriation system—in water short periods, junior users may be impacted by senior right 
holders, whether Indian or non-Indian.  But while all water users face that basic scenario, 
NIWRG somehow finds that result unacceptable with respect to senior tribal water rights, and 
advances state law interests as a rationale to undermine the very existence of tribal reserved 
water rights.   
NIWRG’s arguments cannot be reconciled with the foundational legal principles 
governing tribal reserved water rights.  First, the Tribe’s rights are governed by federal law.  This 
is so as a matter of constitutional law, because “[w]ith the adoption of the Constitution, Indian 
relations became the exclusive province of federal law.”  Cnty. of Oneida v. Oneida Indian 
Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985).  As a feature of Tribal property rights, the Tribe’s water rights 
are unquestionably federal rights, as to which federal law governs, preempting state law.  
Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597-98 (1963) (“Arizona I”); City of Pocatello v. Idaho, 145 
Idaho 497, 503, 180 P.3d 1048 (2008) (“Pocatello”).  Since federal law controls the 
determination of tribal water rights and accords them seniority over state water rights that vest 
after creation of the Reservation, state law cannot provide any basis for restricting the Tribe’s 
senior rights.  While NIWRG gives lip service to the primacy of federal law, NIWRG Br. at 6, it 
in fact complains that “[i]f allowed, the federal claims threaten future curtailment of vested, state 
law water rights,” NIWRG Br. at 11, and implies that tribal water rights are eclipsed by “the 
purposeful and continued deference to state water law by Congress,” id. (citing California v.  
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U.S., 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978)—a case that does not involve tribal reserved water rights).  
NIWRG’s approach would stand the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution on its head. 
Second, NIWRG’s test of absolute necessity runs afoul of the well-established principle 
that agreements with Indian tribes must be construed as the Indians themselves would have 
understood them.  Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 (1999).  
This principle has equal application to treaties and other agreements with Tribes.  Winters, 207 
U.S. at 576; Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 576. In disregard of this principle, NIWRG in effect argues 
that the Tribe entered into agreements with the United States regarding the need for a 
Reservation, and that in doing so the Tribe understood that those agreements provided no 
reserved water at all to ensure that the Reservation would be a viable homeland for the Tribe.  
Particularly since the record reflects the abiding importance of water to the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 
and since the very location of the Reservation turned on the Tribe’s insistence on the inclusion of 
waterways vital to the life of the Tribe, it is simply inconceivable to suggest that the Tribe 
nevertheless understood that it was agreeing to a Reservation without any right to reserved water 
for any purpose.  NIWRG offers no evidence that this was the Tribe’s understanding, and there is 
none.  The record demonstrates precisely the opposite—that water was the lynchpin of the 
negotiations leading to the creation of the Reservation, and so the Indians would have understood 
that in establishing the broad purposes of the Reservation, their right to water both for their 
traditional practices and for their advances in the modern world, would be protected.  
We turn next to NIWRG’s specific arguments. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. New Mexico Does Not Apply to the Coeur d’Alene Tribe’s Reserved Water 
Rights, and NWIRG’s Reliance on New Mexico to Impose a Stringent “Test 
of Necessity” to Defeat the Tribe’s Rights Must be Rejected. 
As this Court has emphasized in discussing tribal reserved water rights: “American law 
treats Indian tribes differently than it does sovereign nations or private individuals.”  Pocatello, 
145 Idaho at 506.  Ignoring this fundamental principle, NIWRG assumes that aspects of the 
ruling in U.S. v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978), apply to defeat all Tribal water rights in this 
case.  See NIWRG Br. at 7.  This flawed assumption is the basis for much of NIWRG’s 
argument.  In particular, NIWRG relies on New Mexico to limit the Tribe’s reserved water rights 
under federal law not only to what NIWRG deems to be the “primary” purposes for which the 
Reservation was established, but also to impose an overarching and impossible standard for 
when reserved water is necessary  Id. 
NIWRG’s argument is fundamentally flawed because New Mexico, which determined the 
water rights of a national forest, has no application to the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.  As this 
Court has recognized, the purposes of an Indian reservation must be construed according to well-
established principles that apply to Indian tribes:   
First and foremost is the notion that agreements with Indians are to be interpreted to the 
benefit of the tribes.  For example, the Supreme Court has stated, 
[W]e will construe a treaty with the Indians as “that unlettered people” understood 
it, and “as justice and reason demand, in all cases where power is exerted by the 
strong over those to whom they owe care and protection,” and counterpoise the 
inequality “by the superior justice which looks only to the substance of the right, 
without regard to technical rules.” 
U.S. v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380-81, . . . (1905) (citing Choctaw Nation v. U.S., 119 
U.S. 1, 28, . . . (1886); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, . . . (1899)).  Congress certainly has 
the power to abrogate Indian treaty rights, but its intent to do so must be clear.  See, e.g., 
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202, . . . (1999); U.S. 
v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40, . . . (1986) (abrogation of treaty rights requires “clear 
evidence that Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the 
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one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by 
abrogating the treaty.”). 
Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506-07.  It is these principles—not New Mexico’s approach regarding 
national forests—that control in this case.   
Contrary to NIWRG’s contention, an Indian reservation is not limited to a single purpose 
to the exclusion of all others, nor is it reasonable to conclude that an Indian reservation has no 
“need” for reserved water rights if the purposes of the reservation can be fulfilled by another 
source.3  Unlike the national forest in New Mexico, an Indian reservation involves the ongoing 
life of a people on lands promised to them.  As would be the case for the life for any people over 
time, this cannot be reduced to one formulaic purpose.  Rather, as the Indians would have 
understood it at the time the Reservation was established, Tribal life on the Coeur d’Alene 
Reservation was centered upon traditional activities like hunting, fishing, and gathering, more 
modern economic pursuits like farming and industrial development, and everyday activities like 
drinking and washing—and water is needed for all of these purposes. 4  As Winters and its 
progeny hold, water for an Indian reservation is reserved broadly, consistent with the purposes of 
the reservation, which include providing a permanent home for the Indians to live—to raise their 
families, to pursue their traditions, and to advance their economies.  See, e.g., Winters, 207 U.S. 
at 576; Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 598-601.  
                                                          
3 A similar argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Winters, where the Court found that 
the Fort Belknap Tribes were entitled to a water right in the Milk River despite the non-Indian 
water users’ argument that sufficient water from springs and streams within the reservation could 
meet the Indians’ water needs. See 207 U.S. at 570, 576; see also In re Gen. Adjudication of All 
Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 989 P.2d 739, 747-48 (Ariz. 1999) (“Gila III”) 
(holding that a right to pump groundwater under state law did not obviate a federal reserved 
right).    
4 The Tribe has appealed the district court’s dismissal of Tribal claims for traditional activities 
other than hunting and fishing, as well as for industrial, commercial, and mixed municipal uses, 
but those are the subject of a separate appeal before this Court.  See Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. State, 
Case No. 45383-2017 (In re CSRBA, Case No. 49576, Subcase No. 91-7755). 
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This is true for the Coeur d’Alene Reservation where the 1873 Agreement provided that 
the “Indians agree to locate and make their homes upon the reservation” and the 1887 Agreement 
confirmed that the “Reservation shall be held forever as Indian lands and as homes for the Coeur 
d’Alene Indians.”  R. at 4202 (Second Aff. Vanessa Boyd Willard, Ex. 5 (Agreement with the 
Coeur d’Alene of July 28, 1873) (“1873 Agreement”))); 1391 (Aff. of Richard J. Hart, Ex. 4 
(Agreement with the Coeur d’Alene of Mar. 26, 1887 (“1887 Agreement”))).  Broad homeland 
purposes are clearly reflected in the negotiations leading to the creation of the Reservation in 
1873—in which the Indians emphasized the importance of waters to the present and future lives 
of their people.  See Section II infra.  Certainly, the Indians would have understood that in 
agreeing to provide the United States with the lands it coveted and with the peace it desired, they 
were retaining for their Reservation the waters necessary for a viable, long-term home, not one 
limited to a single activity.   
In key respects, the purposes of Indian reservations, like the Coeur d’Alene Reservation, 
are the polar opposite from the purposes of national forests, like that at issue in New Mexico.  
The strong preemptive force of federal law protecting Indian present and future uses of water 
when Indian reservations are established is entirely absent in the case of national forests.  As 
New Mexico states, “Congress authorized the national forest system principally as a means of 
enhancing the quantity of water that would be available to the settlers of the arid west.”  438 U.S. 
at 713.  In sharp contrast, Indian reservations were created to provide places for tribes to 
maintain and develop their homelands, with water for both present and future uses.  Put simply, 
national forests were intended in considerable part to protect settlers in their uses of water under 
state law while Indian reservations were largely intended to protect tribes from the settlers’ uses 
of water.  This dichotomy reflects a fundamentally different relationship with state law—with 
national forests there is a basic deference to state law, while with Indian reservations, federal law 
 
 
7 
 
 
is strongly preemptive.  See, e.g., R. at 2231 (Special Master Report, Arizona I) (finding “[t]he 
suggestion is unacceptable that the United States intended the Indians would be required to 
obtain water for their future needs by acquiring appropriative rights under state law”); U.S. v. 
McIntire, 101 F.2d 650, 654 (9th Cir. 1939) (rejecting state law as a basis for acquiring water 
rights on the Flathead Indian Reservation reasoning that “the Montana statutes regarding water 
rights are not applicable because Congress at no time has made such statutes controlling in the 
reservation”); Cohen’s Handbook § 19.03[4], at 1218 (“States have considerable power over 
federal lands, and Congress has generally deferred to state water law relative to federal lands.  
By contrast, the establishment of an Indian reservation . . . preempt[s] state jurisdiction . . . 
Congress has never deferred to state water law relative to Indian reservations.”) (footnotes 
omitted).   
These differences further underscore why the purposes for reserved rights for national 
forests are narrowly construed as in New Mexico, while purposes for Indian reservations are 
broadly construed.  In Potlatch Corp. v. U.S., 134 Idaho 916, 12 P.3d 1260 (2000), this Court 
discussed the differing goals for Indian reservations as contrasted with other federal reservations. 
[Whereas] Winters dealt with the creation of a reservation by treaty, a bargained for 
exchange between two entities[, a federal law creating other reservations, like] the 
Wilderness Act [which established the National Wilderness Preservation System], is not 
an exchange; it is an act of Congress that sets aside land, immunizing it from future 
development.  There is no principle of construction requiring the Court to interpret [it] to 
create an implied water right. 
Id. at 920.5  Both the Montana Supreme Court and Arizona Supreme Court have also recognized 
the significant differences between the creation of Indian reservations and other kinds of 
                                                          
5 See also Goodman Oil Co. of Lewiston v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 136 Idaho 53, 57, 28 P.3d 
996, 1000 (2001) (“Indian reservations are different; distinct from every other type of 
reservation, i.e., national parks, wilderness areas, military reservations, and even further, Indian 
reservations are a distinct entity within the law.”). 
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reservations and held that New Mexico does not apply in determining the reserved water rights 
on an Indian reservation.6 See State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of 
Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 766-68 (Mont. 1985) (“Greely”); In re Gen. Adjudication of 
All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 76-77 (Ariz. 2001) (“Gila V”). 
NIWRG also attempts to use New Mexico as the basis for an absolute “test of necessity” 
that precludes a federal reserved water right if other non-federal sources of water are available 
(even temporarily), because the lack of a federal reserved right would not entirely defeat the 
purposes of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation.  NIWRG Br. at 7, 11-12.  But that is not the test for 
finding a tribal reserved water right.   
An implied reservation of water for an Indian reservation exists where water is necessary 
to fulfill the purposes of the reservation.  Winters, 207 U.S. at 576; Gila V, 35 P.3d at 71 
(quoting Cappaert v. U.S., 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976)); see also Greely, 712 P.2d at 762 
(“reserved water rights are established by reference to the purposes of the reservation”).  The 
standard is not, as NIWRG suggests, whether only a federal reserved water right can fulfill the 
purposes of the reservation, but whether the underlying purposes of the reservation envision 
water use.  Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1269.  If water is needed for the particular purpose—i.e., 
                                                          
6 The Ninth Circuit has indicated that New Mexico does not directly apply to Winters doctrine 
rights on Indian reservations, but nevertheless found it provides useful guidelines.  Agua 
Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1269 n.6 (9th 
Cir. 2017) (“Agua Caliente”) (“we have previously noted that New Mexico is ‘not directly 
applicable to Winters doctrine rights on Indian reservations’”) (citations omitted).  While the 
Ninth Circuit’s approach fails to give adequate consideration to the federal Indian law principles 
that distinguish the situation regarding national forests from that involving Indian reservations, 
the holding in Agua Caliente does not support limiting tribal reserved water rights to a single, 
narrow purpose.  Rather, the Ninth Circuit held in Agua Caliente that “[t]he general purpose, to 
provide a home for the Indians, is a broad one that must be liberally construed.”  Id. at 1270 
(quoting Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Walton I”) 
(emphasis in original)); see also id. at 1265 (“The Executive Orders establishing the reservation 
are short in length, but broad in purpose.”). 
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for sustaining life on an Indian reservation—reserved water is “necessarily” implied.  See, e.g., 
Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 598-99 (finding a reserved right to water where water was “essential to the 
life of the Indian people”).  Therefore, the question before this Court is whether the parties in 
1873 intended to establish the Reservation for purposes that need water.   
NIWRG relies on the decisions of this Court in State v. U.S., 134 Idaho 940, 12 P.3d 
1284 (2000), and U.S. v. State, 135 Idaho 655, 23 P.3d 117 (2001), to support its position.7  
Neither case deals with an Indian reservation or the special principles applicable to tribal 
reserved water rights, nor do they support NIWRG’s cramped view of when a federal reserved 
right is necessary even for other kinds of reservations. 
In State v. U.S., this Court denied reserved water rights for the Sawtooth National 
Recreation Area (“Sawtooth NRA”) because the purpose of creating the Sawtooth NRA was “to 
protect [it] from the dangers of unregulated development and mining operations.”  134 Idaho at 
944 (emphasis added).  This Court found that no water was necessary to fulfill this regulatory 
purpose.  Id. at 946 (water not needed to “control the rate and manner of development of the 
area” or for “limiting mining operations”); see also id. at 947 (“This protection is afforded by the 
existence of statutes and regulations governing mining operations in the Sawtooth [NRA].”); id. 
at 946 (“[t]hese purposes are, and have been, accomplished through the promulgation of land use 
                                                          
7 In addition to these two cases from this Court, NIWRG also relies on Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. 
Department of Game of Washington, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (“Puyallup III”), as a case it contends 
“concluded that the power of the state was adequate for protection of the fish, and a federal 
reserved water right was not necessary to fulfill that purpose.”  NIWRG Br. at 14.  NIWRG’s 
contention that Puyallup III found that “a federal reserved water right was not necessary” is 
wrong.  In Puyallup III, there was no issue of reserved water rights before the Supreme Court, 
and no determination of water rights was made there.  Puyallup III only considered the extent to 
which the State of Washington could regulate the Puyallup Tribe’s fishing rights.  See 433 U.S. 
at 167. 
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regulations for the recreation area which control the rate and manner of development of the 
area”).   
Similarly, in U.S. v. State, this Court also found that no reserved water rights were 
implied for islands reserved in the Deer Flat National Wildlife Refuge (“Refuge”) because the 
purpose of reserving the islands in the Refuge “was to create sanctuaries for migratory birds to 
protect them from hunters and trappers so they would not become extinct and so they could 
continue to benefit husbandry,” and a bird sanctuary does not need water because, even without 
water surrounding the islands, “[h]unting is still prohibited and migratory birds still have a 
sanctuary without a federal reserved water right.”  135 Idaho at 663-64.  Again, this Court found 
that fulfilling the purposes of the Refuge did not require water at all.  The Coeur d’Alene 
Reservation, of course, has far broader purposes than either the Refuge or the Sawtooth NRA, as 
we show in Section II infra. 
NIWRG’s “test of necessity” ignores the fundamental legal principle that state law is 
simply not the source from which the Tribe derives its water rights—and the existence of state 
laws, enacted after the Reservation was created, that provide for the use or protection of water 
cannot be the basis on which to deny the Tribe federally reserved water rights.  See, e.g., Agua 
Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1269 (rejecting the argument that a tribe “does not need a federal reserved 
[water] right” because “the Tribe has a correlative right to groundwater under California law”); 
Gila III, 989 P.2d at 748 (finding state right to pump groundwater would not “adequately serve 
to protect federal rights”); see also Walton I, 647 F.2d at 48 (finding that “the Tribe has a vested 
property right in reserved water” and “subsequent acts making the historically intended use of 
the water unnecessary do not divest the Tribe of the right to the water”). 
In sum, NIWRG’s assumption that New Mexico applies and mandates a strict “test of 
necessity” must be rejected.  The legal principles applicable to Indian tribes are unique, the 
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record here demonstrates that the purposes of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation are broad, and 
accordingly the New Mexico case, which involves a very different set of principles and statutes 
and a very different type of reservation, provides no basis for defeating the Tribe’s claims to 
waters that under the Winters doctrine were reserved to ensure a viable future for this Tribe on its 
Reservation which was promised to it forever.   
II. Congress Ratified the Broad Purposes of Tribe’s 1873 Reservation Within 
the Boundaries Confirmed by the 1891 Act.  
The district court properly concluded that the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was established 
by Executive Order in 1873 and that water rights were reserved to fulfill not only the 
Reservation’s domestic and agricultural purposes, but also traditional fishing and hunting 
purposes. R. at 4320-33 (Order on Mots. S.J.).8  Contrary to this ruling, NIWRG asserts that the 
only purpose for which the Tribe’s Reservation was established under the 1873 Agreement and 
Executive Order was to “promot[e] an agrarian lifestyle on a diminishing reservation.”9  NIWRG 
Br. at 7-9.  NIWRG’s position is not supported by the historical record and is contrary to Idaho 
v. U.S., 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (“Idaho II”).  Rather, as we show next, the Tribe’s 1873 
Reservation was established for broad purposes, including hunting and fishing.  And any 
abrogation of the Tribe’s right to water for the purposes of the 1873 Reservation would require a 
clear statement from Congress.  U.S. v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986); Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 
506.  But here, there is nothing that remotely resembles a clear abrogation of the Tribe’s rights.  
                                                          
8 See supra n.4. 
9 NIWRG makes passing references to the “diminished Reservation” in connection with the 1891 
Act.  See, e.g., NIWRG Br. at 4, 8. But “diminished” is a term of art in this context, which 
connotes a change in Reservation boundaries as a result of a statute that opened the Reservation 
to non-Indian settlement—which occurs only where Congress clearly and plainly intends such a 
result. See Nebraska v. Parker, 136 S. Ct. 1072, 1078-79 (2016).  The Coeur d’Alene 
Reservation has never been held to be diminished, NIWRG did not raise any diminishment issue 
below, and the issue is not presented here. 
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In fact, the Supreme Court in Idaho II squarely held that in 1891 “Congress recognized the full 
extent of the Executive Order reservation lying within the stated boundaries it ultimately 
confirmed . . . .” 533 U.S. at 281.10  
A. The Tribe’s 1873 Reservation was Established for Broad Purposes Including 
Hunting and Fishing. 
1. The Tribe’s 1873 Reservation was established by Executive Order and must 
be treated the same as any other Indian reservation for determining its 
purposes. 
As correctly recounted by the district court, in Idaho II the Supreme Court found that 
Lake Coeur d’Alene and its related waterways were historically important to the Tribe for “food, 
fiber, transportation, recreation, and cultural activities.”  533 U.S. at 265; R. at 4313 (Order on 
Mots. S.J.).  These broad purposes, each tied to the use of water, formed the backdrop to the 
creation of the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation.  When the Tribe and United States reached an 
agreement in 1873, the deal provided for the Tribe to relinquish claims to its aboriginal lands in 
exchange for an expanded reservation that accommodated the Tribe’s insistence on inclusion of 
key water bodies within the retained Reservation. Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 266.  Under the 1873 
Agreement the Tribe agreed to “locate and make their homes upon the reservation.”  R. at 4202 
(1873 Agreement).  The 1873 Agreement also “preserv[ed] the water resource[s]” to sustain the 
Tribe’s traditional activities, including hunting and fishing, because it “added the rivers, lake and 
waters . . . which they demanded remain under their control.”  R. at 1589-90 (E. Richard Hart, A 
History of Coeur d’Alene Tribal Water Use (Nov. 25, 2015) (“Hart Rep. 2015”))); see also Idaho 
                                                          
10 Idaho II principally focused on the Tribe’s traditional water uses and activities at the time the 
Reservation was created in 1873 through congressional ratification in 1891, because the issue in 
the case was title to submerged lands at the time of Idaho statehood.  Idaho II did not look more 
comprehensively at the additional purposes for which the Coeur d’Alene Reservation was 
created but nonetheless strongly supports the intent of the United States and the Tribe in 
reserving water for other present and future purposes, including agriculture, commerce, and 
industry.   
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II, 533 U.S. at 274 (“[a] right to control the lakebed and adjacent waters was traditionally 
important to the Tribe”).  In fact, the 1873 Agreement contains a provision unique to Coeur 
d’Alene that expressly protects the Tribe’s water resources by stating that “the waters running 
into said reservation shall not be turned from their natural channel where they enter said 
Reservation.”  R. at 4202 (1873 Agreement).  At the same time, the Tribe was beginning to 
advance in the arts of civilization, including agriculture and industry, and the 1873 Agreement 
reflects an equally important focus on ensuring that the Tribe’s Reservation would sustain these 
more modern pursuits.  See U.S. v. Idaho, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1105 (D. Idaho 1998) (“Idaho 
II”) (1873 Reservation would include Indian farms and allow for a mill at the upper falls); R. at 
4202 (1873 Agreement) (providing for school, training in commercial and industrial pursuits); R. 
at 1588 (Hart Rep. 2015) (Indians demanded extension of 1867 reservation to include Catholic 
mission and mill privileges). 
Although Congress did not ratify the 1873 Agreement, the President soon acted to 
formalize the 1873 Reservation as set forth in the agreement.  As the Supreme Court explained in 
Idaho II: 
[On November 8,] 1873 President Grant issued an Executive Order directing that the 
reservation specified in the agreement be ‘withdrawn from sale and set apart as a 
reservation for the Coeur d’Alene Indians.’ 
533 U.S. at 266 (citations omitted); R. at 1354 (Aff. of Richard J. Hart, Ex. 3 (Exec. Order of 
Nov. 8, 1873)); see also 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1109 (finding that the 1873 Executive Order was 
intended to “create a reservation for the Coeur d’Alenes that mirrored the terms of the 1873 
agreement”).   
In support of its argument that the Reservation was established solely for agriculture, 
NIWRG cites to statements by federal officials that reference placing the Tribe “on a reservation 
suitable to their wants as an agricultural people” and to the 1873 Agreement’s inclusion of 
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agricultural and industrial tools for the Tribe.  NIWRG Br. at 8.  These statements must be read 
in context of the Agreement as whole, which as discussed above, sought to protect both the 
Tribe’s traditional way of life and more modern advancements.  Moreover, Judge Lodge in Idaho 
II explained that “[r]eports describing the Tribe’s agricultural successes” did not evidence that 
the Tribe was no longer dependent on the Lake and rivers, and they “are in conflict with other 
official assessments, are not necessarily based on personal knowledge, and may be tainted by 
cultural and personal bias.”  95 F. Supp. 2d at 1104. 
NIWRG also asserts that the Tribe did not intend to preserve its traditional activities, 
such as hunting and fishing, because its 1872 petition for an expanded Reservation stated that 
“[w]e think it hard to leave at once old habits to embrace new ones; for a while yet we need to 
have some hunting and fishing.”  Id.  The Tribe’s use of the phrase “for a while yet” however, 
cannot reasonably be read to permanently divest the Tribe of rights it specifically sought to 
protect in requesting a Reservation. When reading the 1872 petition as a whole, Judge Lodge in 
Idaho II explained: 
The second petition makes three points relevant to the Court’s present inquiry.  First, the 
Tribe never entertained the possibility of withdrawing to a reservation that did not 
include the river valleys.  Second, the Tribe considered the area adjacent to the 
waterways its home.  Third, and most important, in 1872 the Tribe continued to rely on 
the water resource for a significant portion of its needs. 
95 F. Supp. 2d at 1103.  Idaho II and the historical record simply do not support a finding that 
the Tribe’s Reservation is limited to an agricultural purpose.   
NIWRG’s attempt to use Winters to support its position is also misplaced. NIWRG Br. at 
8.  Winters was a limited suit brought by the United States “to restrain [various non-Indians] . . . 
from constructing or maintaining dams or reservoirs on the Milk River . . . or in any manner 
preventing the water of the river or its tributaries from flowing to the Fort Belknap Indian 
Reservation.”  207 U.S. at 565.  Unlike the present case, Winters was not a general stream 
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adjudication to declare and quantify the Fort Belknap Tribes’ water rights for all purposes of that 
Reservation.  The United States simply sought to enjoin certain diversions of water upstream of 
the Reservation that interfered with specific irrigation works that the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
and the Tribes intended to construct and operate on the Reservation.  There was consequently no 
reason for the United States to introduce evidence of broader purposes, such as hunting and 
fishing or other traditional activities, for which the Fort Belknap Reservation may have been 
created.  Here, by contrast, this case seeks to adjudicate and quantify all reserved water rights for 
the Coeur d’Alene Reservation for all purposes of the Reservation, not just protect a particular 
contemplated irrigation use from interference by junior users.   
In sum, the issuance of the Executive Order reserved the 1873 Reservation for broad 
purposes, which includes hunting and fishing. Idaho II, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1104.  And the Tribe’s 
reserved water rights vested no later than the date the Reservation was established.  Arizona I, 
373 U.S. at 600; see also U.S. v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1984) (“tribal reserved 
Winters rights vest on the date of the creation of the Indian Reservation”); cf. Winans, 198 U.S.at 
381 (implied tribal rights predating the creation of the reservation carry a time immemorial 
priority date).11 
2. The 1887 Agreement confirmed the purposes of the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation. 
Increasing encroachments from non-Indians caused the Tribe to be concerned that its 
1873 Reservation could be jeopardized or altered.  To guard against this, the Tribe sought 
additional negotiations with the federal government in 1885 seeking congressional ratification of 
its 1873 Reservation.  The Tribe’s petition described its aboriginal territory and noted that “all 
                                                          
11 The district court correctly held that traditional fishing and hunting purposes carry a time 
immemorial priority date and agricultural purposes carry an 1873 Reservation establishment 
date.  R. at 4326 (Order on Mots. S.J.). 
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the lands of your petitioners, so by them owned and herein described, have been taken 
possession of by the whites without remuneration or indemnity, except that portion now by them 
occupied as the present Coeur d’Alene Reservation.” R. at 2041 (Aff. of Steven W. Strack, Ex. 4 
(S. Exec. Doc. No. 122 (1886)) (reprinting Petition from Coeur d’Alene Tribe to President of 
United States (Mar. 23, 1885)).12  In response, Congress authorized a new commission to engage 
in negotiations with the Tribe in 1886, and this enactment expressly recognized establishment of 
the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation.  R. at 1366 (Aff. of Richard Hart, Ex. 4, Report of Comm’r of 
Indian Affairs, to Sec’y of Interior, at 18 (Dec. 13, 1887)) (an act “to enable said Secretary to 
negotiate with the Coeur d’Alene Indians for the cession of their lands outside the limits of the 
present Coeur d’Alene reservation to the United States”) (emphasis added); see also Idaho II, 
533 U.S. at 262 (“Congress authorized new negotiations to obtain the Tribe’s agreement to cede 
land outside the borders of the 1873 reservation.”) (emphasis added).  As the Supreme Court in 
Idaho II explained:  
Congress was free to define the reservation boundaries however it saw fit . . . [but] 
Congress in any event made it expressly plain that its object was to obtain tribal interests 
only by tribal consent.  When in 1886 Congress took steps toward extinguishing 
                                                          
12 The petition also described the vast resources included in the Tribe’s territory and discussed 
various items that the Tribe needed, like “grist and saw mills, proper farming implements, and 
mechanics to help to teach us . . . industrial pursuits.”  Id. at 2042.  These items were not in 
derogation of the Tribe’s traditional pursuits—rather they were listed in the context of 
compensation to settle the Tribe’s claims to lands outside its current reservation—as the petition 
explained it specifically sought to enter  
“proper business negotiations under and by which your petitioners may be properly and 
fully compensated for such portion of their lands not now reserved to them; that their 
present reserve may be confirmed . . . and that ample provision be made by the United 
States by which their compensation shall be annually made them partly in stock, tools, 
mills, and mechanical instruction by proper mechanics, for the permanent benefit of 
every member, young and old, male and female, of the Coeur d’Alene tribe of Indians.”   
Id.  
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aboriginal title to all lands outside the 1873 boundaries, it did so by authorizing 
negotiation of agreements ceding title for compensation.  
533 U.S. at 277 (emphasis added).  In other words, the clear understanding of Congress in 1886 
was that the Tribe then held a Reservation that was established in 1873 and that any “Tribal 
interests” that were obtained would require the consent of the Tribe. 
Under the 1887 Agreement arising out of those negotiations, the Tribe once again agreed 
to cede lands outside the “Coeur d’Alene Reservation”13 and the Agreement confirmed that the 
Reservation “shall be held forever as Indian lands and as homes for the Coeur d’Alene Indians.” 
R. at 1391 (1887 Agreement, art. 5).  The 1887 Agreement unequivocally confirms the Tribe’s 
1873 Reservation and shows that the cession of lands was the only “Tribal interest” that the 
Tribe consented to relinquish.   
NIWRG cites to a handful of facts from the record that show the Tribe was engaging in 
agriculture prior to and during negotiation of the 1887 Agreement.  NIWRG Br. at 9.  The facts 
cited must be understood in context.  In the 1887 Agreement, the United States sought a cession 
of land—there was no effort to strip from the Tribe the ability to use water for the broad 
purposes the Reservation was established in 1873.  See also, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 1104.  The facts 
relied upon by NIWRG merely support the continued recognition of the Tribe’s efforts to engage 
                                                          
13 In fact, much of the 1887 negotiating history is limited to obtaining a cession of lands outside 
the Tribe’s Reservation and the terms of compensation for that cession.  In this respect the 1887 
Agreement is substantially similar to the 1873 Agreement, which the federal negotiators used as 
a reference.  R. at 1383 (Aff. of Richard J. Hart, Ex. 4 (Report of Nw. Indian Comm’n, to 
Comm’r of Indian Affairs at 53 (1887))).  For example, like the 1873 Agreement, the 1887 
Agreement provided that the federal government would expend federal funds to “erect[] on said 
reservation a saw and grist mill, to be operated by steam, and an engineer and miller . . . [and to] 
best promote the progress, comfort, improvement, education, and civilization of said Coeur 
d’Alene Indians . . . .”  R. at 1391 (1887 Agreement, art. 6).  These provisions show that it was 
important to the Tribe that the federal government fulfill the promises made in the 1873 
Agreement and provide the resources necessary for the Tribe to realize the commercial and 
industrial advancements it previously sought for its Reservation economy; thereby reflecting 
continuity, not change, between the two Agreements. 
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in the agricultural and more modern pursuits that it sought to advance within its 1873 
Reservation, while at the same time maintaining its traditional activities.  In fact, the Tribe 
continued to engage in traditional activities throughout this time period,14 and the historical 
record makes clear that during negotiations, Chief Seltice insisted on the continued protection of 
its 1873 Reservation and implored the commission to “preserve for us and our children forever 
this reservation . . . [because] neither money nor land outside do we value compared with this 
reservation.  Make the paper strong; make it so strong that we and all the Indians living on it 
shall have it forever.”  R. at 2157 (Aff. of Steven Strack, Ex. 10 (Council with Coeur d’Alenes at 
78 (Mar. 25, 1887)).  As discussed above, the 1887 Agreement arising out of these negotiations 
must be construed as it would have been understood by the Indians.  Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506.  
The Tribe simply could not have understood an agreement that was fortifying its 1873 
Reservation and ceding lands outside the Reservation as somehow limiting all tribal life on the 
Reservation to pursuing agricultural endeavors to the exclusion of all else.   
Idaho II reinforces that the purposes of the Reservation remained unchanged by the 1887 
Agreement.  Given the Tribe’s traditional reliance on its waters, the Supreme Court in Idaho II 
found that “Idaho [correctly] also conceded . . . that after Secretary of the Interior’s 1888 report 
                                                          
14 During the years prior to the 1887 agreement, the Tribe continued to engage in traditional 
activities.  For example, due to increasing conflicts in the late 1870s between non-Indians and 
other Indian tribes, like the Nez Perce, the Coeur d’Alenes engaged in traditional gathering, 
sometimes under the protection of tribal soldiers.  R. at 1615 (Hart Rep. 2015 (“[a]t the time of 
the outbreak of the Nez Perce War, the Coeur d’Alenes were digging camas near St. Maries”)).  
Around 1878, in order to protect their land and water resources within their Reservation 
boundaries, the Tribe decided to move many, but not all, of their villages and homes closer to the 
De Smet area near their traditional camas grounds.  Id. at 1615, 1621-23. See also R. at 653 (Ian 
Smith, Historical Examination of the Purposes for the Creation of the Coeur d’Alene Indian 
Reservation (2015)) (“Most Coeur d’Alene villages [on lakes and rivers] remained in use until at 
least the 1870s, with some retaining ‘a permanent population as late as 1900.’”); R. at 2669-71 
(Jt. Stmt. Facts) (summarizing continuance of traditional activities after 1873).  Into the 1880s, 
“the Tribe . . . continued to use their traditional fishing spots and remain true to tribal culture.” R. 
at 1626 (Hart Rep. 2015). 
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that the [1873] reservation embraced nearly ‘all the navigable waters of Lake Coeur d’Alene’ . . . 
Congress was on notice that the Executive Order reservation included submerged lands.”  Id. at 
275.  The Supreme Court would not have ruled that the Tribe owned the submerged lands in 
Idaho II if by the time of Idaho statehood in 1890, the Tribe no longer needed these submerged 
lands for hunting, fishing, and other traditional activities.  E.g., 533 U.S. at 274 (finding that “[a] 
right to control the lakebed and adjacent waters was traditionally important to the Tribe, which 
emphasized in its petition to the Government that it continued to depend on fishing”). 
3. The 1889 Agreement and 1891 Act confirmed the purposes of the 1873 
Reservation within the boundaries ratified by Congress. 
This same pattern was repeated two years later.  The 1889 Agreement—like the 1887 
Agreement—only involved a cession of land.  Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically concluded 
in Idaho II that Congress “did not simply alter the 1873 boundaries unilaterally.  Instead, the 
Tribe was understood [by Congress] to be entitled beneficially to the reservation as then defined” 
and Congress only sought an additional land cession within the Tribe’s 1873 Reservation that the 
Tribe “shall consent to sell.”  Idaho II, 533 U.S. at 277.  Accordingly, Congress’s instructions 
confirm that negotiations were limited and sought only a voluntary cession of land within the 
Tribe’s 1873 Reservation and not any effort to undermine the broad purposes of the Reservation.  
See id. at 280-81 (“[t]here is no indication that Congress ever modified its objective of negotiated 
consensual transfer” and “[a]ny imputation to Congress either of bad faith or of secrecy in 
dropping its express objective . . . is at odds with the evidence.”).  
Here again, NIWRG incorrectly suggests that statements made during the 1889 
negotiations show that the Tribe was primarily focused on agriculture and reflect the Tribe’s 
intention to limit its traditional activities.  NIWRG Br. at 10.  While the statements cited by 
NIWRG reflect an awareness that the Tribe was advancing in agriculture (which the district court 
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properly found was another purpose of establishing the 1873 Reservation), none of the 
statements indicate that the Tribe or the federal government understood the 1889 Agreement as 
abrogating or relinquishing any of the purposes for which the 1873 Reservation was created.  See 
Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506-07.  
Contrary to NIWRG’s suggestion that traditional activities, like hunting and fishing, were 
no longer important to the Tribe, NIWRG Br. at 10, the record shows that retaining their 1873 
Reservation, including the Lake and associated waterways, remained a central concern for the 
Tribe throughout the 1889 negotiations.  See Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506. (“‘[I]t is the intention 
of the parties, and not solely that of the superior side, that must control any attempt to interpret 
the treaties.’”) (alteration in original).  For example, Coeur d’Alene leaders insisted upon 
ratification of the 1887 Agreement, which confirmed their 1873 Reservation.  See, e.g., R. at 
1357 (Aff. of Richard Hart, Ex. 4 (Report of Comm’r of Indian Affairs, to Sec’y of Interior, at 3 
(Dec. 7, 1889))) (“[T]he Indians . . . absolutely refused to entertain any proposition [to relinquish 
some of their Reservation] until the old agreement was ratified.”).  The Tribe also expressed 
fears of losing their homes and the importance of their lands and waters.  See, e.g., Idaho II, 533 
U.S at 270; R. at 2115 (Third Council with Coeur d’Alene Indians (Aug. 31, 1889)) (Chief 
Seltice stating that “I, as an Indian, like my land; am very anxious to have land; I do not care 
about money”).  In response to the Tribe’s concerns, when explaining the new boundary line 
under the 1889 Agreement, “General Simpson, a negotiator for the United States, reassured the 
Tribe that ‘you still have the St. Joseph River and the lower part of the lake[,]’” 533 U.S. at 270, 
“and all the meadow and agricultural land along the St. Joseph River.”  U.S. v. Idaho, 210 F.3d 
1067, 1071 n.6. (9th Cir. 2000) (“Idaho II”).   
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And during this time the Tribe was continuing to engage in traditional activities, 
notwithstanding its continued agricultural, commercial, and other industrial pursuits.15  As Judge 
Lodge found in Idaho II, “the placement of the boundary line [under the 1889 Agreement] was 
for the purpose of establishing the Tribe’s rights to the Lake and rivers.”  95 F. Supp. 2d at 1115. 
Certainly, there was no clear expression, or agreement of the Indians, to any loss of any Tribal 
rights, including water rights, within the portion of the 1873 Reservation the Tribe did not cede. 
See Pocatello, 145 Idaho at 506-07. 
Idaho II underscores this same understanding—that apart from ceding certain lands, the 
Tribe retained all other rights on the Reservation that remained.  The Supreme Court found that 
the 1891 Act ratifying the Tribe’s Reservation “contained no cession by the Tribe of submerged 
lands within the reservation’s outer boundaries.”  533 U.S. at 278.16  So despite agreeing to an 
additional cession in the 1889 Agreement, the Tribe did not relinquish any of its rights within the 
boundaries of its remaining 1873 Reservation.17  See also Idaho II, 210 F.3d at 1076 (given the 
Tribe’s dependence on traditional activities “[i]n 1889, the borders of the reservation were 
                                                          
15 See, e.g., R. at 788 (Ian Smith, A Response to the Expert Report of Stephen Wee Regarding the 
Establishment of and Purposes for the Coeur d’Alene Indian Reservation (May 26, 2016) 
(“Smith Rep. 2016”)) (federal officials reported that during the 1880s and 1890s the Tribe 
“continued to rely on hunting, fishing, and gathering activities on their traditionally occupied 
lands” and in 1888 Commissioner J.D.C. Atkins reported that Coeur d’Alene tribal members 
“occasionally go [to the Wolf Lodge district within the 1873 Reservation] hunting for elk and 
deer”). 
16 See also 210 F.3d at 1077 (in the 1889 act authorizing additional negotiations, the “express 
reference to the reservation as the Tribe’s reservation, explicit recognition that the choice to sell 
was the Tribe’s . . . all manifest an awareness and acceptance by Congress of the boundaries of 
the 1873 reservation”). 
17 After ratification and despite the pressures faced by the Tribe and its adaptation to civilized 
and industrial pursuits, the Tribe continued to rely on traditional pursuits as part of their regular 
lives.  In July of 1891, for example, when the resident farmer at Coeur d’Alene attempted to get 
a census of the Indians on the Reservation he “complained about the difficulty of obtaining an 
‘accurate’ census of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe because many tribal members had ‘gone to the 
mountains hunting and fishing which made it impossible to see them all.’”  R. at 788 (Smith Rep. 
2016).   
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contracted and redrawn—but redrawn so as to ensure that the Tribe still had beneficial ownership 
of the southern third of the Lake as well as the portion of the St. Joe River within the 1873 
reservation”).18 
In sum, the 1887 and 1889 Agreements, and the 1891 Act, evidence a continued 
recognition by both the Executive and Congress of the Tribe’s dependence on its water resources 
for traditional purposes, and this served as the basis for the Supreme Court’s decision in Idaho II.   
III. The Tribe’s Reserved Water Rights are Based on the Broad Purposes of the 
Coeur d’Alene Reservation and Cannot be Divested by State Law. 
As discussed in Section I supra, the purposes of the Coeur d’Alene Reservation include 
agricultural, hunting, fishing and domestic purposes—and since each of these purposes requires 
water, the Winters doctrine provides that, as a matter of federal law, water was reserved for each 
of these purposes when the Reservation was established in 1873.  NIWRG, however, argues that 
for each of these Reservation purposes, reserved water rights are not “necessary,” because state 
law, in effect, provides an alternative that NIWRG deems appropriate.  As discussed next, state 
law is not a replacement for, and cannot supplant, federal law, and each of the purposes of the 
Reservation is protected by a federal water right, in amounts to be determined during the 
quantification phase of this case.  Each of NIWRG’s arguments regarding water not being 
“necessary” for the purposes of the Reservation must be rejected. 
 
 
                                                          
18  The Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]he State has not challenged the district court’s factual 
findings, nor has it challenged the court’s conclusion that executive actions reflect a clear intent 
to include submerged lands within the 1873 reservation.” Idaho II, 210 F.3d at 1070.  As such, 
the Ninth Circuit “accept[ed] the facts as given” but also found that the facts “are amply 
supported by the record.” Id. at 1073. 
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A. Reserved Water to Fulfill the Reservation’s Fishing and Hunting Purposes 
Cannot be Defeated by Operation of State Law. 
The Tribe claims federal reserved water rights to support the fishing and hunting 
purposes of the Reservation, and the district court agreed.  R. at 4322 (Order on Mots. S.J.)  
NIWRG does not dispute that water is needed to support these purposes, but argues that the 
Tribe does not have federally reserved water rights for fishing and hunting purposes because “the 
State of Idaho has provided vested water right protections for important waterways within the 
Reservation boundaries, making a federal water right unnecessary.”  NWIRG Br. at 15.  This 
argument fails for several reasons. 
First, NIWRG’s suggestion is tantamount to holding that the Idaho Legislature can divest 
the Tribe of its federally protected water rights simply by passing a statute recognizing state 
protections in the same stream.  However, the State has no authority over the Tribe or Tribal 
rights, including its reserved water rights—either to protect such rights or to regulate or diminish 
them.  See supra Section I; infra Section III.C.2.  Instead, “[t]he Constitution vests the Federal 
Government with exclusive authority over relations with Indian tribes.” Montana v. Blackfeet 
Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985) (citing U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).  The Tribe’s 
reserved water rights are created by federal law and are “dependent on, and subordinate to, only 
the Federal Government, not the State.”  Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian 
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 154 (1980).  Except as authorized by Congress, states have “no 
power to regulate the affairs of Indians on a reservation,” Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 
(1959); Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976).  Accordingly, protection of the 
Tribe’s water rights in Coeur d’Alene Lake and other waterways on the Reservation depends on 
federally protected reserved water rights, not any action by the State. 
Second, NIWRG’s argument ignores the fundamental differences between these state law 
water rights and the water rights the Tribe is entitled to under federal law. See infra Section 
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III.C.2.  The Tribe’s reserved water rights under federal law are intended to protect the 
Reservation as a homeland for the Tribe, including providing water for the special federally-
protected hunting and fishing rights enjoyed by the Tribe on its Reservation.  The state water 
rights relied upon by NIWRG are not intended to protect the Tribe, its Reservation, or its special 
hunting and fishing rights. There is no basis that a state scheme that has no intention to protect 
Tribal rights will somehow achieve that result.  Furthermore, the State’s right under state law to 
preserve the St. Joe River has a priority date of 1992, see Water Right No. 91-7122, while the 
waters of Coeur d’Alene Lake has a priority date of 1927, see Water Right No. 95-2067.  Both of 
these water rights are junior to the Tribe’s reserved water rights for fishing and hunting purposes, 
which have an immemorial priority date.  Moreover, the State’s rights do not provide any 
guarantees to the Tribe because they are subject to changes in state law and uncertain state 
enforcement that the Tribe has no control over. 
NIWRG is also wrong that the fact that Post Falls Dam “keeps the water [of the Lake] at 
or above natural levels” eliminates the necessity for the Tribe’s reserved water rights.  NIWRG 
Br. at 16.19  Post Falls Dam operates pursuant to a 50-year term license under the Federal Power 
Act, which was effective June 1, 2009. Avista Corp., 127 FERC ¶61,265, ¶62,187 (2009).  The 
Tribe’s reserved water rights exist forever and protect the Tribe’s rights in perpetuity.  
Accordingly, the Tribe must secure those rights from any future diminution resulting from third 
parties, such as upstream diversions depleting the Lake. 
This Court should therefore affirm the district court’s determination that the Tribe holds 
reserved water rights to fulfill the hunting and fishing purposes of the Reservation. 
                                                          
19  NIWRG mistakenly claims that this is an “upstream dam [that] prevents water level 
fluctuations in the lake . . . .” NIWRG Br. at 16.  In fact, Post Falls Dam is downstream from the 
Lake.  See Avista Corp., 127 FERC ¶61,265, ¶62,160 (2009). 
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B. Reserved Water to Fulfill the Agricultural Purposes of the Reservation 
Cannot be Defeated Based on Past Agricultural Practices. 
NIWRG concedes that the district court “appropriately concluded that ‘one primary 
purpose of the reservation was to establish an agrarian lifestyle’” for the Tribe and its members. 
NIWRG Br. at 16 (quoting R. at 4320 (Order on Mots. S.J.)).20  NIWRG then curiously faults the 
district court for allowing the extent of the Tribe’s reserved rights for agricultural purposes to 
proceed to the quantification stage of this case. NIWRG Br. at 17. 
Instead, NIWRG contends that the court below should have dismissed the Tribe’s 
agricultural claims without an evidentiary showing regarding the amount of water needed for 
agriculture—which will occur during the quantification stage.  NIWRG seeks to justify this 
outcome because there is “no historical documentary evidence that indicates irrigation was 
practiced” by the Tribe in the past. NWRG Br. at 18.  NIWRG also alludes to two government 
reports in 1921 and 1934 concluding there was no irrigation on the Reservation at those times. 
NIWRG Br. at 19-20.  But the historical record does reflect that the Tribe irrigated small farms 
and gardens around the time the Reservation was created.  R. at 4261 (Hart Rep. 2106) 
Even so, NIWRG’s argument fails.  While water rights under state law are based upon 
and measured by past appropriation and use, federal reserved rights include water needed to meet 
future as well as present tribal needs and are not limited by past irrigation practices.  E.g., 
Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 600 (awarding tribes water under the practically irrigable acreage 
standard, not simply existing uses, because “the water was intended to satisfy the future as well 
as the present needs of the Indian Reservations”); R. at 2232 (Special Master Report, Arizona I) 
                                                          
20 NIWRG similarly characterizes all three Agreements with the Tribe—1873, 1887 and 1889—
President Grant’s 1873 Executive Order, and relevant Congressional actions between 1886 and 
1891 as recognizing agriculture as a primary purpose of the reservation. NIWRG Br. at 7-10.  As 
explained in Section II supra, limiting the Tribe’s Reservation to an agricultural purpose is 
contrary to the historical record and Idaho II.  
 
 
26 
 
 
(tribes are entitled to reserved water rights for use in the “indefinite future to satisfy the needs of 
Indian tribes . . . as those needs might develop”); id at 2228 (“the United States may, when it 
creates an Indian reservation, reserve water for the future needs of that Reservation . . . .”).  It 
would be an extraordinary denial of due process to the United States and the Tribe to foreclose 
them from introducing evidence of the extent of the Tribe’s future needs for water to fulfill what 
NIWRG concedes is a “primary purpose” of the Reservation.   
This Court should accordingly affirm the district court determination that agriculture is a 
purpose of the Reservation and that the quantity of reserved water necessary to fulfill this 
purpose is to be decided by the district court in the quantification stage of this case. 
C. Reserved Water to Fulfill the Domestic Purposes of the Reservation Cannot 
be Defeated by the Source of the Water or by State Law. 
The Tribe claims consumptive water rights for domestic uses, which includes water for 
drinking, bathing, cleaning and general household uses.  R. at 9-10 (Tribal Claims Cover Letter 
from Vanessa Boyd Willard, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Gary Spackman, Dir., Idaho Dep’t of 
Water Resources (Jan. 30, 2014) (“Tribal Claims Letter”)).  The Tribe relies on groundwater as 
the source of water to meet the present and future domestic needs of homes within the 
Reservation.  Although the district court found that “the parties do not dispute the reservation 
carries federal reserved water rights for domestic use,” R. at 4323 (Order on Mots. S.J.), NIWRG 
advances two arguments on appeal to counter the common-sense proposition that the Reservation 
has a basic need for reserved water for domestic purposes to make it livable.  NIWRG first 
claims that reserved water rights may not extend to groundwater.  NIWRG Br. at 23.  NIWRG 
asks this Court to rule that as a legal matter there cannot be a claim for groundwater “due to a 
lack of binding authority.”  NIWRG Br. at 25.  But that is no rationale at all—there is no binding 
authority either way.  But, there is a compelling argument supporting the inclusion of 
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groundwater, as the Winters doctrine turns on the purposes of the Reservation, not on the source 
from which the water is produced, and the clear weight of authority supports the extension of 
reserved water rights to groundwater. 
NIWRG then claims that the Tribe’s reserved water rights for domestic uses are 
unnecessary because state law provides a permitting exemption for domestic uses.  NIWRG Br. 
at 24.  This same assertion was recently rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d 
at 1272, and it should be rejected here as well.  NIWRG’s argument also fails because a 
permitting exemption under state law is in no way equivalent to a federal reserved water right.   
1. Reserved water rights include groundwater. 
NIWRG does not offer any persuasive rationale for why reserved water rights should not 
extend to groundwater, asserting that this Court cannot find a federal reserved water right 
extends to groundwater until the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly says so.  NIWRG asserts that the 
Supreme Court “declined to apply the federal reserved water rights doctrine to groundwater” in 
U.S. v. Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128 (1976).  NIWRG Br. at 23.  The Supreme Court, however, did 
not need to decide that question in Cappaert because it concluded that “the water in the pool is 
surface water.”  426 U.S. at 142; see also Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1270 n.8 (explaining 
same).21  Nevertheless, Cappaert found that “the implied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine is 
based on the necessity of water for the purpose of the federal reservation,” and held that “the 
United States can protect its water from subsequent diversion, whether the diversion is of surface 
or groundwater.”  426 U.S. at 143 (emphasis added).  There is no practical difference between 
the injunction against groundwater pumping in Cappaert and a reserved right to groundwater 
                                                          
21 In Cappaert, the Ninth Circuit held that “the United States may reserve not only surface water, 
but also underground water.”  U.S. v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313, 317 (9th Cir. 1974), aff’d on other 
grounds 426 U.S. 128 (1976).   
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because both ensure that water is available to fulfill a senior right and can limit the use of water 
by a junior user.  
NIWRG recognizes that “[m]ore recently the Ninth Circuit found that a federal reserved 
water right may be sourced to groundwater,” NIWRG Br. at 24 (citing Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d 
1262).  Despite this, NIWRG points to the Wyoming Supreme Court’s decision in In re the 
General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76, 99-
100 (Wyo. 1988) (“Big Horn I”), aff’d by an equally divided court sub nom. Wyoming v. U.S., 
492 U.S. 406 (1989), which is the sole exception to the preponderance of case law supporting the 
extension of reserved water rights to groundwater.  Although the Big Horn I Court held “that the 
reserved water doctrine does not extend to groundwater,” because “not a single case applying the 
reserved water doctrine to groundwater is cited to us,” 753 P.2d at 99, it nonetheless recognized 
that “[t]he logic which supports a reservation of surface water to fulfill the purpose of the 
reservation also supports reservation of groundwater,” id.   
Much has happened since Big Horn I, and today there is strong authority supporting 
reserved rights to groundwater.  The doctrinal basis for including groundwater as a source for 
reserved water rights is set out in the Arizona Supreme Court’s carefully reasoned decision in 
Gila III, 989 P.2d 739. The Gila III court held that federal reserved rights may include rights to 
groundwater, id. at 746-48, and reserved right holders enjoy greater protection from groundwater 
pumping than do holders of state created rights, id. at 750.  After a detailed review of relevant 
case law, the Arizona Supreme Court concluded that: 
if the United States implicitly intended, when it established reservations, to reserve 
sufficient unappropriated water to meet the reservations’ needs, it must have intended 
that reservation of water to come from whatever particular sources each reservation had 
at hand. The significant question for the purpose of the reserved rights doctrine is not 
whether water runs above or below the ground but whether it is necessary to accomplish 
the purpose of the reservation. 
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Gila III, 989 P.2d at 747 (emphasis added).22   
The Montana Supreme Court has similarly held in Confederated Salish & Kootenai 
Tribes of the Flathead Reservation v. Stults, 59 P.3d 1093, 1098 (Mont. 2002), that “there is no 
distinction between surface water and groundwater for purposes of determining what water rights 
are reserved” and therefore, “no reason to limit the scope of our prior holdings by excluding 
groundwater from the Tribes’ federally reserved water rights in this case.” Id. at 1099.23  
This Court should therefore follow the careful reasoning of Agua Caliente and Gila III, 
which represent the strong weight of authority, and affirm the district court’s determination that 
the Tribe holds reserved rights to groundwater for domestic purposes.  
2. A permitting exemption for domestic uses under state law does not render the 
Tribe’s reserved water rights unnecessary. 
NIWRG also argues that a reserved water right under federal law to pump underground 
water for domestic purposes is not necessary because state law permits persons to divert up to 
13,000 gallons per day for domestic purposes.  State law, however, is generally inapplicable to 
tribes on Indian reservations unless Congress has provided otherwise.  See, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 
358 U.S. 217.  The Tribe’s reserved water rights vested no later than when the Reservation was 
established and are not subservient to subsequently enacted state law, which, of course, might 
change in the future.   
                                                          
22 In a 2001 decision by the district court in the SRBA regarding reserved water rights for the 
Mountain Home Air Force Base, Burdick, J. agreed with the reasoning of Gila III and held that 
federal reserved water rights may extend to groundwater.  In re SRBA, Case No. 39576, SRBA 
12, at 7 (Id. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. 2001) (Order Disallowing Uncontested Federal Reserved Water 
Right Claims), available at http://srba.idaho.gov/FORMS/61-11783disallow.PDF (last accessed 
Apr. 12, 2018). 
23 Accord Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. U.S., 9 Cl. Ct. 660, 699 (1986), aff’d 877 
F.2d 961 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mont. 1968); Park 
Ctr. Water Dist. v. U.S., 781 P.2d 90, 91, 95 & n.13, 96 (Colo. 1989) (en banc).  See also 
Cohen’s Handbook, § 19.03[2][b], at 1213-14 & nn.25-26. 
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NIWRG’s argument has been rejected most recently in Agua Caliente, where water 
agencies in that case argued that the tribe there “does not need a federal reserved water right” to 
groundwater because “the Tribe has correlative right to groundwater under California law.”  849 
F.3d at 1272.  In rejecting this argument, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that “state water rights are 
preempted by federal reserved rights” and the dispositive issue is not whether “water is currently 
needed to sustain the reservation . . . [but] whether water was envisioned as necessary for the 
reservation’s purpose at the time the reservation was created.”  Id. at 1272. (citations omitted).  
NIWRG’s reformulation of this argument under state law fails here too, because the subsequent 
availability of water under state law does not eliminate the need for water to fulfill the purposes 
of the Reservation.  See also Walton I, 647 F.2d at 48 (“[S]ubsequent acts making the historically 
intended use of the water unnecessary do not divest the Tribe of the right to the water.”). 
NIWRG also incorrectly seeks to substitute a federal reserved water right with a 
permitting exemption under state law.  NIWRG claims that the Tribe’s reserved water right for 
domestic purposes is unnecessary because “Idaho law provides an exemption from the permitting 
requirement for such uses,” and “anyone in the State of Idaho—including a tribal member—may 
divert and use up to 13,000 gallons per day for domestic purposes.”  NIWRG Br. at 24 (citing 
I.C. § 42-111) (emphasis added).24  However, a water permit “merely expresses the consent of 
the state that the holder may acquire a water right.”  Basinger v. Taylor, 30 Idaho 289, 165 P. 
522, 524 (1917).  In other words, NIWRG proposes to replace a judicially-decreed federal 
reserved water right with a permissive use of water for domestic purposes under state law.   
                                                          
24  The statutory provision cited by NIWRG provides the definition of “domestic use” and 
“domestic purposes,” which limits the use of such water to up to 13,000 gallons per day.  See 
I.C. § 42-111.  The permitting exemption for drilling domestic wells to which NIWRG refers is 
I.C. § 42-227. 
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 NIWRG’s proposal would subject the Tribe’s domestic uses of water to state law, which 
is exactly the opposite of the Supreme Court’s dictate that “[f]ederal water rights are not 
dependent upon state law or state procedures.” Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 145; Colville Confederated 
Tribes v. Walton, 752 F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1985) (“Walton III”).  Critically, in times of 
shortage exempt uses are administered as the most junior rights in the system. I.C. § 42-607.  
Further, the permitting exemption would only allow the Tribe to use up to 13,000 gallons per 
day, I.C. § 42-111, a quantity that may be significantly different than the amount the Tribe is 
entitled to under federal law. 25    The permitting exemption does not exempt a domestic use of 
water from the limitations of the prior appropriation doctrine, and it could also be repealed by the 
State’s Legislature at any time.   
The Tribe’s domestic claims are also not limited to present use but extend to future needs 
for water.  See, e.g., R. at 5575 (Notice of Claim 95-16672).  Under the State’s exemption, the 
Tribe would still need to establish a water right under Idaho law to protect its use from prior 
appropriators, which would require a showing of actual beneficial use and trace its priority date 
to the date of first use.  See City of Pocatello v. Idaho, 152 Idaho 830, 841, 275 P.3d 845, 856 
(2012) (“When one diverts unappropriated water and applies it to a beneficial use, the right dates 
from the application of the water to a beneficial use.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  The state law water right could also be lost to non-use.  I.C. § 42-222(2) (all state 
water rights “shall be lost and forfeited by a failure for the term of five (5) years to apply it to the 
                                                          
25 In ordering the commencement of the CSRBA, the district court noted that the State’s Director 
of Water Resources testified that, “although a de minimis domestic . . . right is limited to a 
diversion of 13,000 gallons per day, the right is still limited to historical beneficial use.”  In re 
General Adjudication of Rights to Use of Water from Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin Water 
Sys., Case No. 49576, at 20 (Id. 5th Jud. Dist. Ct. Nov. 12, 2008) (Mem. Decision on Petition to 
Commence Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin General Adjudication).  By contrast, here the 
Tribe claims the reserved right to the full 13,000 gallons per day per well to fulfill present and 
future needs.  R. at 5575-78 (Notice of Claim 95-16672). 
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beneficial use for which it was appropriated”).  But tribal reserved water rights vest no later than 
the date the Indian reservation was established, and are quantified based on the Tribe’s present 
and future needs, which secures the Tribe with a right to use water in the future, even though the 
water has not been put to beneficial use.  Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 600.   
NIWRG fails to acknowledge the fundamental differences between state water rights and 
federal reserved rights when it asserts that the availability of water under state law obviates the 
need for a reserved water right for domestic purposes.  As the district court correctly held, this 
Court should find that the Tribe is entitled reserved water rights for domestic uses because they 
are necessary “to make the reservation livable.”  R. at 4322 (Orders on Mots. S.J.) (quoting 
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 616 (1983)). 
IV. The Tribe’s Lake Claim is Valid. 
The Tribe claims reserved rights to Lake Coeur d’Alene (“Lake Claim”) to fulfill the 
broad purposes for which the Reservation was established.  See supra Section II; R. at 11-12 
(Tribal Claims Letter).  The Lake’s importance to supporting the Tribe’s traditional activities 
within the Reservation was established in Idaho II.  See also n.10.  Nevertheless, the district 
court concluded that lake level maintenance was not a primary purpose of the Reservation, R. at 
4328 (Order on Mots. S.J.), and disallowed all the Tribe’s claimed purposes of use in the Lake 
except for the “fish and wildlife habitat” purpose of use, which it allowed to go to quantification, 
R. at 4302 (Final Order Disallowing Purposes of Use).26   
NIWRG argues that the district court erred in allowing any portion of the Tribe’s Lake 
Claim to proceed to quantification and asks this Court to dismiss the Tribe’s Lake Claim in its 
entirety; or if it is not dismissed, to instruct the district court to determine the ownership of the 
                                                          
26 The Tribe has separately appealed the district court’s dismissal of the Lake Claim for other 
purposes. See supra n.4. 
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submerged lands under Lake Coeur d’Alene.  NIWRG Br. at 20-22.  As discussed below, 
NIWRG’s arguments that the Lake Claim should be dismissed because it is not quantifiable, and 
that adjudication of the Lake Claim requires an adjudication of title to the Lake bed, are without 
merit. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the district court’s ruling on the fish and wildlife 
habitat purposes of the Tribe’s Lake Claim.   
A. The Tribe’s Lake Claim is Quantifiable. 
The United States provided the method for quantifying the Lake Claim in its Notice of 
Claim.  R. at 6279 (Notice of Claim Federal Reserved Water Right No. 95-16704) (“Notice of 
Claim No. 95-16704”).  The Lake Claim is “for in situ maintenance of the Lake’s natural 
elevation” according to average monthly elevations that take into account inflows and outflows 
for the Lake based on its natural hydrograph.  Id. at 6278-79.  The Lake Claim ensures that there 
is sufficient water in the Lake to maintain lake elevation that “reflect[s] the natural Lake 
processes” before the Post Falls Dam was built, to fulfill the purposes of the Reservation.  Id. at 
6279.  The district court properly concluded that one of those purposes of water is to fulfill the 
fish and wildlife habitat purpose of the Reservation.  R. at 4322 (Order on Mots. S.J.); R. at 4302 
(Final Order Disallowing Purposes of Use). 
Despite this, NIWRG asserts there is no standard for quantifying the claim without 
providing any explanation as to why the United States’ and Tribe’s method of quantification 
should be rejected.  NIWRG Br. at 21.27  Similar to the Tribe’s quantification method, state law 
also recognizes lake levels as means to protect in situ water.  See I.C. §§ 42-1502 (using lake 
levels to protect “fish and wildlife habitat”); 42-1503(d) (including preservation of “lake level”).  
                                                          
27 The district court did not address issues related to quantification because this phase of the case 
only involves issues of entitlement. See R. at 461-62 (Order Consolidating Subcases & Order 
Bifurcating Proceedings). 
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Indeed, the State claims a water right to maintain a “minimum lake level of 2125.09 feet above 
sea level” for Round Lake.  See Water Right No. 96-8503, available at http://www. 
idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/RightReportAJ.asp?BasinNumber=96&SequenceNumber=8503
&SplitSuffix=%20%20&TypeWaterRight=True (last accessed Apr. 12, 2018). 
NIWRG prematurely attempts to raise a quantification issue here by misusing this 
Court’s statement in Potlatch, 134 Idaho at 922, that a “standard of quantification” of water is 
necessary to reserve water rights.  See NIWRG Br. at 21.  In Potlatch, this Court found that the 
federal Wilderness Act does not provide a basis for implying water rights for a federal 
wilderness area because “the Wilderness Act does not define purposes that necessitate a 
reservation of water.”  134 Idaho at 922.  The Court’s decision was based on its conclusion that 
reserved water was not necessary to fulfill the purposes of the Wilderness Act, not that any 
reserved water right was “unquantifiable.”  This Court used the term “standard for 
quantification” in Potlatch to contrast the Wilderness Act with other federal reservations by 
which a standard for quantification can be determined, such as the establishment of Indian 
reservations, which are for “human habitation,” id. at 920, 922, or the creation of Devil’s Hole 
national monument discussed in Cappaert, 426 U.S. 128, which was for the “preservation of a 
rare fish.”  134 Idaho at 921, 922.  In fact, this appeal involves an Indian reservation that the 
district court properly concluded included fishing and hunting purposes—purposes that are 
similar to those that this Court noted were “quantifiable” in Potlatch.   
Moreover, Idaho II and the historical record show that the United States established the 
Reservation in 1873 as a permanent home for the Tribe and impliedly reserved water to fulfill 
broad purposes, including sustaining fish and wildlife habitat. See supra Section II.  Reserved 
rights to water in the Lake are necessary to fulfill these purposes.  Suppose for instance, that the 
Lake was fully drained and the lakebed was dry.  In such a situation, the Tribe would not only be 
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without the ability to use the Lake for traditional and other purposes, but also would have lost a 
fundamental aspect of its homeland as defined by Idaho II.  While this is not likely under current 
circumstances given the operation of Post Falls Dam under a FERC license, see 127 FERC at 
¶61,265, ¶62,169, the Tribe’s Lake Claim is important for protecting the Tribe’s reserved rights 
from diminution by junior users today and in the future, where circumstances, including the 
existence of the Post Falls Dam, may someday be changed in ways that place viability of the 
Lake in question.28  The Lake claim ensures that, through limiting diversions, the Lake and its 
waters, which were central features in the creation of the Reservation, are available to the Tribe 
consistent with the purposes of the Reservation.   
For these reasons, NIWRG has not provided any valid reason to dismiss the Lake Claim 
based on an inability to quantify the claim.  
B. The United States’ Ownership of Submerged Lands in Trust for the Benefit 
of the Tribe Cannot be Adjudicated Here. 
NIWRG requests that if this Court rules in favor of the Tribe’s Lake Claim, it must 
instruct the district court to adjudicate the extent of the United States’ trust title to submerged 
land on the Reservation.  NIWRG Br. at 21-22.  This request must be rejected because allowing 
the Tribe’s Lake Claim to move forward to quantification does not—and cannot—require an 
adjudication of title to submerged lands within the Reservation. 29   Contrary to NIWRG’s 
                                                          
28 For instance, the licensee could surrender its FERC license, see, e.g., 18 C.F.R. §§ 6.2, 6.4, 
and the license for Post Fells Dam provides that if it is surrendered, FERC can require the 
licensee to remove the dam. 127 FERC at ¶62,207.  However, removal is not always required. 
See FERC: Hydropower - How to Surrender a License or Exemption, FERC, available at 
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/comp-admin/surrender.asp (last accessed 
Apr. 11, 2018) (Upon surrender, a decommissioning plan can include leaving project features in-
place for other uses, or removal of project features and site restoration.”). 
29 Contrary to NIWRG’s assertion, the district court never “recognized” that land ownership is 
relevant here.  NIWRG Br. at 22.  NIWRG made that representation at oral argument, id. (citing 
Tr. at p. 140, L. 17-25, p. 142, L. 13-20, p. 143, L. 15-19), but the court never acknowledged 
NIWRG’s contention. See, e.g., id.  In its summary judgment order the district court noted that 
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assertion, the extent of a party’s land ownership is distinct from the scope of its water rights.  
NIWRG conflates these issues, by claiming that “[t]he federal government only reserves 
‘appurtenant water’” NIWRG Br. at 22 (quoting Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138), and so 
“[d]etermining the extent of the submerged lands that were reserved by the United States is a 
prerequisite for finding what water is appurtenant to such lands.”  Id.  Not so.  Here, the United 
States has explained that the Tribe’s reserved water rights are not based on its ownership of 
submerged lands, but rather on the purposes of the Reservation.  R. at 4077 n.11 (U.S.’s Mem. in 
Reply to State of Idaho & Objectors).30  
In any event, any inquiry in the ownership of submerged lands within the Reservation is 
barred by federal sovereign immunity.31  NIWRG’s proposed adjudication of the scope of the 
United States’ ownership of submerged lands, which are held in trust for the benefit of the Tribe, 
is really an action to quiet title to land owned by the United States.  See Idaho v Coeur d’Alene 
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 282 (1997).  The McCarran Amendment does not give state courts 
jurisdiction to quiet title to land, see 43 U.S.C. § 666 (waiving United States’ sovereign 
immunity only for “adjudication” and “administration” of “rights to the use of water in a river 
system or other source”) (incorporated in I.C. § 42-1406B)).  Although the United States has 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
NIWRG “represents that the issue relates to the United States’ lake level maintenance claim,” R. 
at 4328 (Order on Mots. S.J.), but declined to take a position on this issue.  
30 This Court’s recent decision in Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, 162 Idaho 754, 405 P.3d 13 
(2017), is not to the contrary.  In Johnson, the appellants challenged tribal court jurisdiction over 
their construction of docks and pilings on submerged land on the Reservation, arguing that the 
submerged land was not tribal trust land.  162 Idaho at 760.  Land ownership was relevant there 
because, unlike the determination of water rights at issue here, tribal jurisdiction is tied directly 
to land status, id. at 761-62 (discussing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) and 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001)). 
31 Sovereign immunity can be raised at any time because it is a jurisdictional issue.  See Zylstra 
v. State, 157 Idaho 457, 461, 337 P.3d 616, 620 (2014) (“jurisdictional issues” are not waived on 
appeal); State. v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673, 676, 315 P.3d 861, 864 (Idaho Ct. App. 2013) (citing 
State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004)).   
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narrowly waived its immunity for some quiet title actions, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a), such actions 
may only be brought in federal district court, id. § 1346(f), and this waiver expressly provides 
that it does not apply to trust or restricted Indian lands, id. § 2409a(a); U.S. v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 
834, 843 (1986).  No additional waiver of sovereign immunity has been granted here. R. at 6280 
(Notice of Claim No. 95-16704).  Federal law thus precludes NIWRG’s request to adjudicate 
land title to the submerged lands under the Lake, which the Supreme Court determined in Idaho 
II are held in trust for the Tribe.  See 533 U.S. at 265, 281.  
NIWRG also says it cannot be “presumed” that the United States owns “all of the 
currently submerged lands,” NIWRG Br. at 22, apparently referring, as it did below, to “lands, 
which became submerged only after the construction of Post Falls Dam in 1907 . . . .” R. at 2436 
(Mem. in Supp. of NIWRG’s Mot. S.J.).  Even if sovereign immunity were not a bar here, 
NIWRG’s claims fail.  NIWRG’s supposed distinction between submerged lands has no basis in 
fact.  The Lake Claim asserts the Tribe’s right to the natural hydrograph of the Lake from before 
the dam was constructed.  R. at 6279 (Notice of Claim No. 95-16704).  The only difference 
between lands submerged under the natural hydrograph and the current Lake level, is that the 
Lake now retains its natural springtime water level throughout the summer months.  See R. at 
2583 (U.S.’s S.J. Mem.); see In re Sanders Beach, 143 Idaho 443, 450, 147 P.3d 75, 82 (2006) 
(describing that dam holds springtime natural water levels through the summer).  Although the 
time of year that lands are submerged has changed, the extent of the submerged lands has not.   
For these reasons, this Court should reject NIWRG’s request for an inquiry into the title 
to submerged lands.   
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the district court’s determination (1) that the Coeur d’Alene 
Reservation was established in 1873 for domestic, agricultural, hunting and fishing purposes; (2) 
that water rights were reserved to fulfill those purposes; and (3) that the Lake Claim can proceed 
to quantification. 
 Respectfully submitted, this 13th day or April, 2018. 
       Counsel for the Coeur d’Alene Tribe 
 
By: ______________________________ 
Vanessa L. Ray-Hodge 
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